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?I believe the time has come for our two ancient civiliza-
tions to build a strong contemporary relationship involv-
ing strategic and global partnership that will have a 
great signifi cance for Asia and I believe for the world as 
a whole? 
Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh, Address to the 
Joint Session of the Japanese Diet, December 15, 2006
Abstract
The construction of an integrated East Asia and an ?East Asian community? is an important 
objective of the strategic partnership built by Tokyo and Delhi. Since the 1990s, India has indeed 
been keen on reintegrating East Asia for economic and political reasons. For its part, Japan is 
interested in getting closer to India, which shares its desire to build a multipolar Asia and coun-
terbalance Chinese power. In this regard, Japan played an essential role in securing the partici-
pation of India in the East Asia Summit.
The regional project is underpinned by a discourse on shared democratic values, common 
interests, and cultural references. Since the late 19th century, Japan and India have indeed tried 
in their own way to theorize, promote and lead East Asia as a region. These efforts, along with 
the famous interactions between Japanese and Indian intellectuals and independence leaders, 
are used today to justify their rapprochement. 
Despite the diplomatic discourse, it seems that the Japan-India partnership is mainly re-
sponding to neorealist concerns in East Asia dealing with the balance of power. This nascent 
partnership shall be closely considered as an interesting new element in the Great Game unfold-
ing in East Asia, even if the Japan-India relationship is still shaped to a great extent by Chinese 
and US factors.
1. Introduction 
The Japanese partnership with India is of particular signifi cance regarding the construction 
of an East Asian Community. This nascent relationship between ?the most developed and the 
largest Asian democracies,?1 grounded on a rich historical legacy of contributions toward East 
Asian regionalism, hopes to play a central role in the current regional construction.
The rapprochement between Japan and India since 2000 mainly results from the evolution 
of the geopolitical context: the rise of China and the new strategic partnership between Delhi and 
Washington. The Indo-Japanese relationship also builds on Indian economic growth and the re-
discovery of common values, interests and strategic objectives between the two nations.2 
India has indeed been keen on reconnecting with East Asia since the 1990s for economic 
and political reasons, while Japan started a ?re-asianization? process after the 1997 crisis. Japan 
takes interest in getting closer to India, which shares its desire to build a multipolar Asia and 
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counterbalance Chinese power. In this regard, Japan played an essential role in integrating India 
into the East Asia Summit. This ?mutually benefi cial? relationship is also very signifi cant for this 
new wave of Asian regionalism, which seems to shift from an ?Asia-Pacifi c? to a ?broader East 
Asia? focus. 
As Paul Evans3 has suggested, it is useful to distinguish between regionalization and region-
alism, the latter dealing with the expression of an identity and a cultural bedrock that allows the 
construction of a regional organization based on economic and political convergence (regionali-
zation). From a methodological perspective, this means that the Japan-India contribution shall be 
examined for these two dimensions of the East Asian regional construction. The complex real-
ity of Asian international relations justifi es an ?analytic eclecticism?4 in order to grasp the most 
comprehensive image of the ongoing processes. While drawing from a broad realist perspective, 
I will test some constructivist and functionalist approaches when reviewing Japanese and Indian 
policy and discourse about the construction of an integrated Asia. 
This paper aims to discuss the implications of Japan-India partnership for the regional 
project, the regional identity, and the regional balance of power. The importance of the nascent 
Japan-India relationship in Asia will be assessed, as well as its capacity to ?make sense? for East 
Asia identity and current regionalism. 
2. The Regional Project behind the Current Indo-Japanese Rapprochement 
The conjunction of exogenous and endogenous factors explains the current Japan-India rap-
prochement. The rise of China transforming the power paradigm in Asia is an object of concern 
for both Delhi and Tokyo. The bilateral partnership is part of their effort to hedge against Chinese 
power. The about-face of the American administration toward India since the year 2000 is an-
other important reason behind Tokyo’s new approach toward Delhi. 
The rapprochement also builds on Indian economic growth. Prompted by liberalization re-
forms since 1991 and accompanied by a charm offensive toward East Asia, it is an important ele-
ment that motivated Japan to reconsider India as an attractive economic partner. The two coun-
tries also share common values (democracy and market economy) and strategic interests (building 
a multipolar world, gaining a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council).5
The historic visit of Prime Minister Mori to India in 2000 marked the turning point in the bi-
lateral relationship; Japan and India decided to build a ?global partnership for the 21st Century.?6 
Most of the motives underpinning the Japan-India rapprochement directly or indirectly relate to 
the two countries’ ambitions in East Asia. 
(1) Reinvesting the New Asia: Common Interests
Since the 1990s, the re-engagement in East Asia takes place in the context of the ?Look East 
policy.? Aiming at reconnecting India with a dynamic, integrated East Asia, it is part of an over-
all strategy to become a regional power. Accordingly, the Indian national interest has been wid-
ened to embrace the greater Indian Ocean, ?from the Persian Gulf to the strait of Malacca.?7 This 
new strategic orientation is accompanied by a build-up of maritime capacity.8
Japan adopted a more proactive role in Asia in the wake of the 1997 Asian fiscal crisis, 
when it provided a large amount of assistance for Asian countries and proposed the creation of 
an Asian Monetary Fund. Even though this initiative, opposed by the U.S. and China, eventu-
ally failed, Southeast Asian countries came to see Japan as the real economic leader of Asia, and 
asked Tokyo to take a greater political role in the region.9 Since then, Japan has been very active 
in promoting regional agreements in the economic, political, and security fi elds10 in an effort to 
refocus its diplomatic efforts toward Asia. This Japanese interest in East Asia also has to do with 
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the rise of China and Beijing’s attempt to take the lead in the region.
India and Japan share the perception that Asia is the new development locomotive of the 21st 
Century. Asia represents half of the world’s population, includes the world’s second economic 
power, two giant nations that have grown at a fast pace (more than 7%), and a collection of new 
industrialized countries. Asia has a high potential for economic cooperation with a vertical spe-
cialization, dense regional networks for production, and more than 55% intra-zone trade. In this 
context, Tokyo and Delhi wish to support this ?new Asian era? by defi ning ways to cope with the 
US-defi ned ?arc of instability,? building an ?arc of advantage?11 and contributing to the construc-
tion of an East Asian Community.
(2) The Diplomacy of the ?Arcs? 
In 2004, Manmohan Singh, the father of Indian liberal reforms in the 1990s, fl oated his vi-
sion of an ?arc of advantage and prosperity?12 across Asia, in the context of the failure of multi-
lateral trade negotiations and the strengthening of regional groupings. Considered as an extension 
of the ?Look East Policy,? the ?arc of advantage? is a new vision to promote a regional zone of 
shared prosperity. This expression emphasizes the importance of reconnecting India to East Asia 
through the multiplication of trade exchanges and development of reliable transportation routes.
This objective was to be reached by the completion of a Free Trade Agreement with 
ASEAN.13 Furthermore, an Asian Economic Community14 encompassing the ASEAN+3 ?from 
the Himalayas to the Pacifi c Ocean? would be built. This integrated market would enable ?large 
scale movement of people, capital, ideas, and creativity.?15 
Further elaborating on his vision, Singh proposed a Pan-Asia Free Trade Agreement in 
December 2005 based on an ASEAN+6 framework,16 taking the European Union as a model.17 
This vision is mainly a project of economic reintegration in East Asia, for India to take part in 
the construction of a large pan-Asian free trade area, which could sustain the country’s economic 
growth. 
At the end of November 2006, Taro Aso, then Minister of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), intro-
duced the expression ?Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.?18 It was one of the rare attempts to ap-
proach Japanese diplomacy in conceptual terms. Because this bold move provoked some negative 
reactions, especially from China and some Middle Eastern countries, the rhetoric soon disap-
peared from the political discourse. This vision holds that Japanese foreign policy is founded on 
a new pillar, ?value-oriented diplomacy,? based on universal values such as democracy, freedom, 
human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. Accordingly, Japan shall assist the young 
democracies in the outer rim of the Eurasian continent in order to build an ?arc of freedom and 
prosperity.? As an Asian pace-setter in terms of democracy and economic development, Japan is 
presented as a legitimate leader in the region. In the same statement, Aso stated that Japan must 
also ?make its ties even fi rmer with friendly nations that share the common views and interests.? 
Comparing  Japanese bilateral relations with China and India, Taro Aso also called for an im-
provement in the relationship with Delhi.
In contrast with the Indian ?arc,? which is mainly of an economic nature, the Japanese vi-
sion of the ?arc? is much more political and deals with the promotion of democracy, to allow a 
more balanced economic freedom and shared prosperity. However, in March 2007, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Aso and his Indian counterpart Mukherjee ?reaffi rmed that there exists common 
objectives and values between the idea of ?Arc of Freedom and Prosperity? proposed by Japan 
and the idea of ?Arc of Advantage and Prosperity? proposed by India, and that realisation [sic] 
of such common ideas would benefi t not only Japan and India but also the whole of Asia.?19 
It must be added that in a recent speech on foreign policy given at the end of June 2009, 
Prime Minister Aso elaborated on the concept of ?Arc of Freedom and Prosperity? as a basis for 
forming ?a modern-day version of the Silk Road.? This new vision, calling for connecting routes 
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?from the Pacifi c Ocean to Europe,? clearly meets the Indian version of the ?arc.?20 
Japan and India used the ?arc? metaphor in order to advance their vision of an integrated, 
multipolar East Asia, extended from India to Australia and New Zealand.
(3) Japan, India, and the Genesis of the East Asia Summit
Since the beginning of the 21st century, in the context of the failure of global trade mecha-
nisms, numerous bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreements were tied up in East Asia. 
With more than 80 agreements, the question is now how to shift from a complex noodle bowl of 
overlapping FTAs to a meaningful pan-Asian framework. The idea of building an ?East Asian 
community? eventually came up after a process of refl ection led by the countries of ASEAN+3 (or 
APT for ASEAN Plus Three). 
 In 1998, APT established successively the East Asian Vision group (1999-2001) and 
the East Asia Study Group (EASG). The EASG report, issued in 2002, concluded that ?the 
ASEAN+3 framework remains the only credible and realistic vehicle to advance the form and 
substance of regional cooperation in East Asia.?21 The report made no mention of India or Aus-
tralia. However, intense diplomatic pressure from Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, and Vietnam 
succeeded in including India in the project, and in less than 3 years.22 The main reasons behind 
this change of heart were both realpolitik concerns and an economic rationale; ASEAN countries 
eventually agreed that the presence of two demographic and economic giants in the East Asia 
?Community? would be better than one. This concern matched perfectly with Japanese interest 
to balance China in the region. 
In the meantime, Prime Minister Koizumi proposed an ?East Asian community? in 2002, 
with ASEAN+3, Australia, and New Zealand as the core founding members, while remaining 
open to the U.S., India, and others.23 India was later included as a full member in the Japanese 
vision of a regional project. This invitation resulted from the recognition that India is no longer 
?a local power? but ?one of the three major powers of Asia.?24 Also, the Japanese vision of Asia 
broadened from ?East Asia? (APT) to ?the entirety of Asia,? including South Asia. Three main 
reasons accounted for this new strategic horizon: economic globalization (linked with India’s 
economic growth), the regional security issue (especially the revelation of proliferation connec-
tions between North Korea and Pakistan) and Japan’s security interest (in particular, the safety of 
maritime routes and the JMSDF missions in the Indian Ocean after 2001).25
In April 2005, a strategic orientation was outlined for the Japan-India partnership which 
included the realization of an East Asian Economic Community as an ?Arc of Advantage and 
Prosperity.?26 On this occasion, Tokyo conveyed its decision to support India’s membership in the 
East Asia Summit. Before the fi rst EAS, Japan and India lobbied to have a Chair declaration in 
which EAS (and not APT) would be presented as the basis for an East Asian Community.27
In addition, Tokyo proposed a CEPEA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia 
or ?Nikai initiative?) in April 2006. The CEPEA consists of a fund to start a comprehensive eco-
nomic partnership (CEP) and a policy-oriented research institution based on the model of OECD: 
the ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia). This consultative body will 
study the feasibility of a regional FTA, the ultimate end of the initiative.
The ?Greater East Asian Community? would be organized around ASEAN at the core, with 
Japan, China, and South Korea as principal members and Australia, New Zealand, and India as 
the outer circle.28 This larger framework allows Japan to counteract and contain China which 
had stolen a march on Japan in knotting up bilateral FTAs in the region. Enlarging the East Asia 
framework to embrace India also allows Japan to win U.S. approval for this new regional organi-
zation and thereby reconcile potentially contradictory interests: to become more actively involved 
in East Asian regionalism while maintaining a strong alliance with the U.S.29
Despite the fi rst mixed reactions to this ambitious project, Japan could count on India and 
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its Pan-Asia free trade proposition (see supra), inasmuch as this latest proposal made India a full, 
original member of a community founded on an ASEAN+4 concept, and could eventually extend 
to include Australia and New Zealand.
Both projects had two rival proposals: the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), promoted 
by China at the second EAS and based on ASEAN+3; and the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacifi c 
(FTAAP) supported by the U.S. in late 2006 (partly in reaction to East Asian regionalization), 
and viewed as a revival of APEC (excluding India). Japan supported the U.S. proposal ?as one 
of the multilayered efforts in the region,?30 meaning that it does not compete with the CEPEA 
project, generally seen as more feasible than a broad FTAAP. At the Second EAS (January 2007), 
the Chair Statement eventually announced that the CEPEA proposal would be studied. A modus 
vivendi was found between Japan and China by stating that ASEAN would stand as the driv-
ing force.31 Although the legitimacy of the ASEAN+6 framework has been debated, especially 
by China and Malaysia, it was eventually endorsed by ASEAN; in the Chairman’s Statement of 
the 2006 and 2007 ASEAN Summits, the EAS is described as ?an important component of the 
merging regional architecture [that] would help build an East Asian Community.? Besides, the 
ASEAN+6 framework makes sense economically; most economic assessments conclude that an 
ASEAN+6 Free-trade zone would be more effi cient than an ASEAN+3 FTA.32
(4) The East Asia Summit and the Question of Asian Identity
The EAS is generally presented as a larger, improved version of the East Asia Economic 
Caucus (EAEC) proposed by Malaysian President Mahathir in 1990.  The EAEC proposal was 
designed to counter the ASEAN’s integration in APEC and create a purely ?Asian? economic 
organization, without the Western nations. As such, it drew extensively from the discourse on the 
superiority of Asian values (mainly equated with Confucian values) that explain the success of 
the Asian model of development.
It was an early vision of the ASEAN+3—notwithstanding the discourse on Asian values—
but the project failed because Japan did not want to commit to this organization that excluded the 
U.S. Also, the Asian countries lacked a common experience and common ?others? to make their 
organization meaningful enough. The 1997 Asian crisis provided for both elements.33 Moreover, 
in 1996, the constitution of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) confirmed that the EU equated 
Asia with ?East Asia.? At that time, the candidacy to involve India in the forum was rejected.34 
Japan and India share a functionalist approach toward East Asian regionalization. Aiming at 
preserving peace and prosperity in Asia, they both support the construction of a free-trade area in 
order to sustain growth and connect the whole Asian region, from India to Australia. 
According to a recent survey, 81% of the Asian strategic elite expresses support for building 
an ?East Asian Community?; however, the membership is still debated.35 This debate highlights 
the lack of a well-defi ned East Asian identity. In the EAS, ?East Asia? is understood as a geopo-
litical, constructed concept, rather than a purely geographical expression. Actually, the origin of 
the idea of a ?broader East-Asia? or ?Greater Asia? community can be traced back to the prewar 
period, when, in the context of anti-imperialism and anti-westernism, Japanese and Indian intel-
lectuals conducted a national discussion on the Asian identity. 
3. Coming Back to the Roots: Signifi cance of Past Interactions on Pan-Asianism 
Historical and cultural references on bilateral connections regarding Asianism and Asian 
identity are extensively used in the Indian and Japanese diplomatic discourses. Most of the time, 
both Indian and Japanese diplomats or leaders elaborate on a ?romantic vision? of the relation-
ship, referring to early Buddhist connections (travel of the Indian monk Bodhisena to Japan in 
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the 8th Century), the friendship of Tagore and Okakura Tenshin (end of the 19th Century until 
1913), the Japanese support of the revolutionary activities of Rash Behari Bose (1915-1945), and 
Chubas Chandra Bose (1943-1945), and the dissenting judgment of Justice Radhabinod Pal at the 
Tokyo war crimes trial in 1948.36 
These references are signifi cant at the bilateral level, but also at the regional level. It is then 
important to look at the true history behind the recurrent clichés used by the politicians to under-
stand their meaning. It is also a unique occasion to study the Indian and the Japanese vision of 
pan-Asianism and to think about the current signifi cance of this ambivalent ideology for current 
Asian regionalism. Even if pan-Asianism is a rejected discourse today because it underpinned the 
Japanese violent militarism in the region, it is still an important part of the cultural and intellec-
tual bedrock of Asian identity.
 
(1) Ambivalence of the Pan-Asianist Discourse in Japan and India
The discourse on ?Asia? (labeled as ?Asianism? or ?pan-Asianism?) in Japan and India 
was designed in the context of both countries’ nationalist projects against Western domination at 
the turn of the 20th century. Asianism claims that despite their diversity, the Asian countries share 
common cultural values, especially a high degree of spirituality and aesthetic sensitivity, in oppo-
sition to the materialist and decadent West. The aim is to give the Asian countries a sense of unity 
based on a renewed pride in Asian identity, different from the Western vision of Asia as a back-
ward region. Ultimately, ?Asia? is a rallying cry for Asian nations to come together to escape or 
emancipate themselves from colonization. 
As such, ?Asia? is a malleable concept that was invested in by ambivalent, contradictory 
political projects. Koschmann successfully captured this idea in a nutshell: ?Without the West 
there is no East. The very idea of Asia is ultimately empty and variously exploitable. The ideolo-
gy of Asianism rejects that emptiness by attributing positive, essential meaning to Asia, however 
it might be conceived geographically.?37 This analysis is shared by an important Japanese histo-
rian, Takeuchi Yoshimi, in his book Nihon to Ajia (1st edition 1966). 
In India and Japan, pan-Asianism was used both as a project of national emancipation and a 
project of domination in the region. 
In Japan, Asianism could be characterised by three elements: (1) the resistance to western 
infl uence in the region; (2) the belief in a common identity in Asia; and (3) the claim of Japan to 
take the lead against Western imperialism.38
Originally, Asianism was developed as a reaction to the westernization of Japan during the 
Meiji era (1868-1912). At that time, Japanese authorities, in order to protect national independ-
ence, decided to take a shortcut to modernization by rapidly adopting and mimicking Western 
institutions and cultural habits. At Fukuzawa Yukichi’s call in 1895, it was time to escape the 
fellow Asian countries, considered as backward, and to join the modern West (datsuA nyûO). As 
a reaction, several intellectuals and politicians began to advocate a return to Asian values and 
traditions. They claimed that Asia, not the Western club of Great Powers, should be the place for 
Japan’s national project.39 While the ?liberal? school called for Japanese solidarity with the op-
pressed nations of Asia, the ?hardliners? asserted Japanese superiority and hegemony in the re-
gion. 40 
On the other hand, the Indian elite had to get rid of the inferiority complex infused by the 
British colonizers in order to develop its own nationalism. This process involved a rediscovery 
of Indian traditional values and history reconsidered in a positive light.41 In this context, the con-
cept of an Asian identity and unity was very appealing and supported the formation of an Indian 
national identity. Thus, the two processes worked in synergy. In India, the ?universalist? school 
(Tagore, Gandhi, Nehru) called for an Asian Federation, that would serve to better advance the 
interest of Asian countries toward freedom and independence,42 while the ?Greater India? school 
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advocated a new Indian supremacy within its cultural sphere of infl uence, ?from Kerala to Indo-
nesia.?43 The ?Greater India? ideology saw India as a benevolent hegemon that has spread its cul-
ture and spirituality (Buddhism and Hinduism) in South and Southeast Asia, making the region 
its cultural backyard.
(2) Japanese and Indian Contributions to Pan-Asianism Thinking
The early references in Japan to Asianism (ajiashugi), which fi rst appeared in 1892, referred 
to a community of history and values among Japan, Korea, and China.44 The stress put on the an-
ti-westernism and anti-imperialism explains the later extension of the concept to embrace South-
east Asia, and eventually South Asia.45 
In India, meanwhile, the fascination with Japan’s modernization process and its victory over 
Russia in 1905 was huge, and several opinion leaders came to see Tokyo as an example and a 
valuable partner in the Indian fi ght for independence.
The interactions between Japan and India on pan-Asianism were mainly via individuals. 
India, of course, was under British colonial rule. On the other hand, the role of the Japanese state 
was ambivalent. Tied to its alliance with Great Britain from 1902, Tokyo was not supportive of 
the pan-Asianist trend until the 1920s. When Japan gained the status of quasi-great power, pan-
Asianism emerged as a practical ideology that could be implemented to demonstrate Japan’s cul-
tural and political might in Asia.46 Meanwhile, growing Japanese differences with its British ally 
led to greater attention and protectiveness toward the Indian anti-colonial nationalists who sought 
Japanese support. Despite this involvement, one must keep in mind that support for Indian anti-
colonialism actually?came from the margins of Japanese society.?47 
(3) Okakura and Tagore
The Japanese art critic Okakura Kakuzo (or Okakura Tenshin, 1862-1913) asserted in 1903 
in the fi rst sentence of his major work The Ideals of the East (1904): ?Asia is one.? This book de-
scribes the striking spiritual values of the East and deems Japan to represent the quintessence of 
Asian culture. As such, Japan is presented as the central actor (but not hegemonic actor) in Asian 
modernization and emancipation from the western powers.48
The strong friendship that united Okakura with the Bengali poet Tagore (1861-1941) 
is well known. Okakura met Tagore in India, where he traveled and lived for a while (1901-
1902). Working on Asian art, he wrote in English and mostly for a foreign audience (two of his 
four masterworks were written in India), which made him an exception in the Japan of his day. 
Okakura developed a particular defi nition of Asia, similar to Tagore’s view, that evolved from a 
broad European-biased view to a Buddhist-tinged vision in which ?Asia? equated with the Bud-
dhist civilization ?Buddhaland.?49
Okakura was actually more famous abroad than in Japan, where the political and intellectual 
elite (including Okawa Shumei) rediscovered his work in the 1930s in their attempt to build the 
concept of a ?Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity? (Daitôa Kyôeiken). Okakura is even 
regarded by some as one of those who inspired the Bengali revolutionaries of the Secret society 
Anushilam Samiti at the origin of the terrorist independence movement in Bengal (though others 
question his real infl uence).50
Tagore also traveled to Japan, and in a 1916 message he expressed his admiration for an 
Asian nation that could embrace modernity and defeat a Western country in military combat. He 
called upon Japan to lead as a virtuous example of a benevolent, spiritual, alternative modernity.51 
But Tagore also worried about the rising Japanese nationalism. In his lecture ?Nationalism in 
Japan,? he stated: ?What is dangerous for Japan is not the imitation of the outer features of the 
West but the acceptance of the motive force of the Western nationalism as her own.?52
In 1938, in his correspondence with the poet Yone Noguchi, Tagore bemoaned Japan’s ag-
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gressive expansionism and wrote that ?the doctrine of ‘Asia for Asia’…as an instrument of polit-
ical blackmail has all the virtues of the lesser Europe which I repudiate and nothing of the larger 
humanity that makes us one across the barriers of political labels and divisions.?53
The friendship between Okakura and Tagore is idealized as being representative of India-
Japan close interactions for pan-Asianism. However, upon closer inspection, we discover that 
Okakura’s liberal vision of Asianism was not heard in Japan, and that his work was distorted in 
the 1930s by expansionists. Also, this reference obscures Tagore’s critical evaluation of Japanese 
nationalism after the 1920s and Okakura’s passing.
(4) Imperialist Japan and Indian Revolutionaries 
In the 1930s and 1940s, the pan-Asianist ideology was fully part of the Japanese state im-
perialist project. As the invasion in China advanced, most Asian leaders turned their backs on 
Japan. Tokyo then sought to legitimize its behavior by referring to an early, liberal pan-Asianism 
of the sort promoted during the pre-World War One era.54 
Even though Japan was harshly criticized55 by the core leaders of the Congress Party like 
Gandhi and Nehru, its connections with some Indian revolutionaries were maintained as long as 
both parties saw a way to advance their respective interests.
Rash Bihari Bose, who had been living in Japan since 1915, married a Japanese woman and 
was given Japanese nationality. He used his network in ultra-nationalist circles56 to gain access to 
Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, persuading him to support the Indian anti-colonial cause. As a result, 
two conferences gathering Indian expatriates in Asia were held in Tokyo and Bangkok in 1942 
where it was decided to establish the Indian Independence League and the Indian National Army 
(INA). 
Tokyo was actively involved in the formation of the INA in Singapore, initiated by the intel-
ligence agency F-Kikan, composed of Indian prisoners of war captured in the Malaya and Burma 
fronts. But the constitution of the INA complicated the relationship between the Indian revolu-
tionaries and the Japanese Central command who wanted to use the army as a bulwark for the 
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere on the Burmese front. However, the charismatic revolu-
tionary Subhas Chandra Bose, who took command of the INA in 1943, reversed the situation and 
convinced the Japanese to attack Imphal in Northeast India. The operation turned out to be one of 
the most decisive early defeats for the Japanese Imperial Army.57 
In the wake of the war, the dissenting judgment by Indian Justice Radabhino Pal at Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East refl ected the magnanimity of some Indian nationalists 
toward imperialist Japan. Justice Pal, who had studied in Kolkata, was well aware of the con-
nections between independence-seeking Bengalis and Japanese nationalists.  He had a great ad-
miration for Japan.58 He denounced the political bias of the Tokyo trial as ?victors’ justice.? He 
considered that the Tokyo trial wrongly judged and condemned oriental civilization, identifi ed as 
the cultural root of Japan’s militarism.59 However, Pal’s opinion was his own, and was not repre-
sentative of the Indian government.60 
(5) A Utilitarian Relationship
This short survey of Japan-India historical interactions regarding Asia reveals, fi rst of all, 
the asymmetry of interest between the two countries; while Japan is clearly identifi ed as a leader 
and key player in the region by Delhi, India is viewed as a country at the margin of East Asia and 
the Japanese strategic horizon. The Japanese interest in India at that time was a very contextual 
one and resulted more from an anti-western sentiment than a genuine interest in India’s situation. 
Anand Mohan Sahay,61 who spent almost twenty years (from 1923) in Kobe and was very dis-
appointed to fi nd no Indian or Japanese allies to support India’s independence, is illustrative of 
Indians who felt deceived by the Japanese position. Also, the interest in India nurtured by Okawa 
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Shumei, a major theorist of imperialist pan-Asianism in Japan, actually originated from his anti-
westernism and racism; he never sought to travel to India and thus developed an exotic, romantic 
view of the country.62 
On the Indian side, it is important to recall that as Japan turned imperialist, the core leaders 
of the Congress Party became very critical and turned their attention to China. The emotional at-
tractiveness of China stemmed from a belief in the spiritual unity of India and China and a com-
mon experience of oppression. Both countries were described by Nehru in 1938 as ?sister na-
tions.?63 The reality is that only a minority of Indian anti-colonial nationalists placed their bet on 
Japan.  
The links between Japanese nationalists and Indian revolutionaries were therefore marginal 
and fueled by self-interest. Each party used its contacts to further its own interests and agendas. 
This is revealed by the efforts made by Subhas Chandra Bose to fi nd an alternative ally in China 
or the USSR to support the Indian liberation movement when the Japanese war effort began its 
slide toward eventual defeat by late 1944.64 The initial common understanding centered on an 
Asian identity was soon corrupted by the Japanese imperialist project.
(6) What is the Signifi cance of These References Today?
In the 1990s, India grounded its Look East Policy in a cultural discourse that harked back to 
the heritage of Tagore and Nehru. These references, coupled with a diplomacy focused on eco-
nomic cooperation and exchange, were used to reassure East Asian investors for whom India was 
a turbulent, distant country. This strategy was particularly used vis-à-vis Japan.65 
The legacy of Tagore and Okakura served to establish common Asian values based on spir-
ituality: Prime Minister Rao asserted in a speech in Japan in 1992: ?Asia is one, the essence of 
this oneness being spirituality.?66 At the same time, he asserted that Asia was based on syncretism, 
citing the Indian spiritual contribution to the Asian identity as the cradle of Buddhism and Hindu-
ism in an attempt to integrate India into East Asia, at least culturally.
In Japan, the use of these references has several meanings. First, the reminders that India 
and Japan share only positive history are supposed to reassure the business community, scalded 
by the anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in China in 2005 because of their historical 
disputes.
These references also portrayed India in a positive light, as an historically friendly nation 
to Japan, and a stable partner that shares its democratic values. This attempt to mold a positive 
perception of India in Japan complements Tokyo’s gradual softening of its stance toward India’s 
nuclear power status. 
Finally, these references are particularly used by right-wing, nationalistic politicians and in-
tellectuals. These elements that focus on positive Japanese attempts to unite Asia and assist Asian 
independence movements, and the mention of Justice Pal, can be used to present a prettier, sani-
tized vision of Japan’s wartime history. 67 By softening the perception of Japanese war crimes and 
questioning the legal validity of the Tokyo trial, the neo-nationalists are trying to ?break away 
from the postwar regime,? instil a new sense of pride in the Japanese nation, and call for a strong 
Japanese political role in the region without dwelling on the details of the past. Former Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, who elaborated his nationalistic agenda for Japan in his book ?Toward a 
Beautiful Country,?68 is a striking example. He is also an Indophile. When he traveled to India in 
August 2007, he talked before the Indian Parliament about a ?broader Asia? at the confl uence of 
the Pacifi c and Indian Oceans,?69 he went to Kolkata to visit the house of Subhas Chandra Bose,70 
and he met with the son of Justice Pal.
Several Japanese scholars, like Takako Hirose,71 worry about the danger of such nationalist 
rhetoric that does not represent healthy ground on which to build the current relationship. Moreo-
ver, it lends itself to an old-fashioned and stereotypical view of India, still an exotic country in 
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the minds of many Japanese.
As the legacy of Japan’s wartime imperialism prevented its postwar political infl uence and 
intimate involvement in the affairs of East Asia, India’s engagement with Southeast Asian coun-
tries was similarly impeded by that nation’s earlier rhetoric on an Indian cultural sphere (?Greater 
India?). This meant that both powers had to make creative efforts to involve themselves substan-
tively in the evolving architecture of postwar relationships within East Asia. Since they had never 
fought or sought to dominate each other, and because they shared common values and perspec-
tives arising from their status as democratic nations with market economies, Japan and India 
found a basis for joining together in an effort to raise their infl uence in the region.  
Cultural and historical reference points are thus used to advance national interests in build-
ing ties and integrating into a region. But India and Japan are, above all, pragmatic nations; as 
such, they are also engaged in a classic diplomatic strategy of power balance. 
4. Constructing an Integrated Asia or a Balanced Asia? 
The China and United States factors are determining, to a great extent, the future shape of 
relationships within East Asia and between East Asia and the rest of the world.  What is the posi-
tion of the Japan-India partnership regarding these two powers? Are they participating in a new 
axis of democracies against China? Are they trying to balance U.S. power in Asia? 
(1) The China Factor
Rising China is regarded with concern by both Japan and India. While both countries view 
Beijing’s economic growth as an opportunity, they also worry about the military build-up and the 
growing diplomatic infl uence of Beijing in Asia and in the world. Their diplomatic rapproche-
ment is thus a way for Tokyo and Delhi to hedge against China. This is particularly clear with re-
spect to the Japanese side, as Tokyo is competing with Beijing to take the lead in shaping the new 
architecture for the region. Japan is now ready to assume a greater political role in the region as 
the most advanced Asian democratic power, and seeks to weaken Chinese infl uence by highlight-
ing the authoritarian nature of their regime. 
If the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing is any warmer since 2002, it is still char-
acterised by suspicion and mistrust. Several contentious issues like Tibet, the territorial disputes (in 
Kashmir, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh) and the competition for infl uence in the Indian Ocean 
still loom large in the relationship.72 The military-strategic community in India is thus very recep-
tive to the adoption of a containment strategy toward China. 
On the other hand, even as India is open to a discussion on values,73 Delhi still sticks to its 
strategic autonomy rhetoric and refuses to get embroiled in any diplomatic or security arrange-
ments that openly aim at containing China.74 Despite offi cial reluctance to use balance of power 
rhetoric, and its rhetorical commitment to a traditional non-alignment policy, India is de facto 
playing the realist game of balancing power in Asia in order to advance its national interests.75 
In this context, the East Asia Summit framework has been characterized as an ?anti-re-
gion.?76  Shaun Breslin argues that the EAS is clearly not the most relevant and consistent frame-
work to build the region, considering the diversity of the participants. He asserts that the EAS is 
actually advocated by the regional elite, in reaction to the nascent regional mechanisms that are 
taking shape within the APT framework ?in an attempt to neutralize Chinese power.?77
(2) The U.S. Factor
While the goal of balancing China is clearly shared by Japan and India, both countries are 
also trying to fi nd a balance in their relationships with the United States. The history of the quad-
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rilateral initiative is telling with respect to Japanese and Indian expectations toward the U.S. and 
China.
Tokyo supports the rise of complementary and alternative poles of power in Asia and the 
creation of a network of like-minded partners. Highlighting the importance of drawing closer to 
India, Prime Minister Abe (September 2006-September 2007) suggested that Delhi be included 
in the ongoing strategic trilateral dialogue between Tokyo, Washington, and Canberra.78 This pro-
posal received the blessing of Vice President Cheney in February 2007. This strategic quadrilat-
eral is underpinned by a unity of democratic values that implicitly aims to exclude China. 
The strategic component of this ?quadrilateral initiative? was seen in the MALABAR 07-2 
naval exercises, when 20,000 military personnel, 28 ships, 150 airplanes, and 3 aircraft carriers 
assembled in the Bay of Bengal during October 2007.79
So far, it has been the only naval gathering of the four countries. The Chinese authorities 
indeed voiced concerns about what they labeled as a foreshadowing of an ?Asian NATO.?80 As 
a result of that, plus related domestic sensitivities, the Rudd administration in Australia decided 
to withdraw from the quad, and the Indian communists put pressure on the Singh government to 
avoid it. As a result, the quadrilateral initiative is currently in abeyance.81 
In this context, it seems unlikely that the rhetoric of a ?coalition of democracies? will reap-
pear in the short term. Moreover, this does not appear to be the diplomatic orientation of the new 
Obama administration,82 nor of the Hatoyama government in Tokyo since September 2009. Even 
so, it is worth noting that Japan participated twice in India-U.S. naval exercises in April 2007 and 
June 2009. 
If multilateral initiatives centering around the U.S. seem diffi cult to pursue because of Chi-
nese sensitivities, it would, however, be more acceptable to include Washington in certain forms 
of a multilateral regional framework. 
The question of U.S. integration into an Asian regional organization is central. The U.S. 
is a de facto Asian power. It still maintains 80,000 soldiers in the Asia Pacifi c theatre and it is a 
major trading partner for East Asian countries; the current crisis has shown how dependent the 
ASEAN+3 countries are on U.S. economic growth. From a realist point of view, it therefore 
seems inconceivable to build a viable regional economic and security structure without including 
the U.S. Accordingly, 80% of APT experts strongly support the inclusion of the U.S. in EAS; the 
same percentage supports the inclusion of India.83
Neither Japan nor China nor India really opposes the inclusion of the U.S. in the EAS, and 
there is a broad consensus on an ?open and inclusive? regional institution. The Obama admin-
istration is currently studying the possibility of signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
with ASEAN,84 required to take part in the EAS. This signature could mean a greater U.S. com-
mitment to the East Asia regional process in the next few years. In terms of balance of powers, 
this scenario would enhance the weight of Japan and India in the region. However, a revival of 
FTAAP, based on APEC, is also foreseen.85 In this perspective, India, which is not part of APEC, 
would be marginalized. In terms of membership, the Rudd proposal on an Asia Pacifi c Commu-
nity (EAS + United States) could be a compromise solution.86 
The APEC Summit held in Singapore in November 2009 featured the new U.S. political will 
to get back to Asia. Few days before the summit, in Tokyo, U.S. President Obama, reaffi rming 
the strong ties binding the U.S. and Asia, stated: ?As an Asia Pacifi c nation, the United States ex-
pects to be involved in the discussions that shape the future of this region, and to participate fully 
in appropriate organizations as they are established and evolve.?87 More importantly, U.S. Trade 
representative Ron Kirk announced that the U.S. will take part in the negotiations toward a Pa-
cifi c Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, to be built on the Trans-Pacifi c Strategic Economic Part-
nership (P4) between Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei. These negotiations, involving 
Australia, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S., and Vietnam, aims to build a 
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high-quality FTA that would form the basis for a future FTAAP.88 
On the other hand, the new Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama, who took power after the 
historic victory of the Democratic Party of Japan in late August, is a strong advocate of an ?East 
Asian Community? gathering the ASEAN+6 countries, inspired by the European Union model. 
Although Hatoyama repeatedly emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japan partnership in East 
Asia after Obama’s visit to Tokyo, the Japanese prime minister never formally listed the U.S. as a 
core member of the East Asian community.89 
Examining these declarations, it seems that the Japanese and U.S. approaches to Asian re-
gional architecture are increasingly diverging, which could cause additional friction within the 
alliance as the Hatoyama government is trying to adjust and balance its relationship with Wash-
ington.
What about India? By hosting his fi rst state dinner in Indian Prime Minister Singh’s honor, 
Obama tried to reassure him about the solidity of the U.S.-India partnership. However, Obama 
did not elaborate on India’s role in Asian regional integration. New Delhi still hopes to be al-
lowed to join APEC next year, as the moratorium on new members will expire. The Australian 
government recently reiterated that it would back India’s bid,90 while Japan has remained mute 
thus far. The DPJ government will have to make up its mind, as Yokohama will host the 2010 
APEC summit. However, India’s accession will raise many questions, such as the geographical 
limits and the regional balance within the Asia Pacifi c Forum, and the issue of Pakistan’s place.
While Prime Minister Hatoyama has been devoting most of his energy to managing Japan’s 
relationship with China and the United States, he has also attempted to reassure India about his 
government’s interest in developing their bilateral relations by visiting Delhi toward the end of 
2009. Hatoyama and Singh agreed to establish a 2-plus-2 high level dialogue involving senior 
foreign and defence ministry offi cials of the two countries, to strengthen their political partner-
ship.91 Hatoyama also expressed his resolve for an early conclusion of the bilateral FTA negotia-
tions.
(3) Values in the East Asian Community
The debate between Peter Drysdale and Hugh White posted on the East Asia Forum website 
is representative of the arguments on the role of values in the context of East Asian regionalism.92 
While White argues that a regional political and security organization needs to be built on a com-
mon set of principles, Drysdale retorts that his vision is hopeless, considering the diversity of the 
actors. He calls for a ?rule-based, not a principle-based Asia Pacifi c Community?93 to secure the 
cooperation of all the regional players. 
What about Japan? While the Japanese government favors the construction of an Asian 
Community in principle, different approaches coexist and contend; some favor APT over EAS 
(for the Ministry of Finance), or the opposite (for the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry), 
while the mainstream supports a multilayered architecture with both APT and EAS (as MOFA). 
Within the Japanese expert community, the realists tend to be against the EAS framework, deem-
ing it to be romantic and unrealistic regarding the clash of interests between Japan and China, 
and the importance of the United States in the region. Proponents of the East Asian community 
argue that this common project would slowly engage all of the powers in the region and comple-
ment the respective nationalisms with a regional identity sentiment.94 While Tokyo supports a 
functionalist approach toward East Asian regionalism, it also increasingly emphasizes the role of 
values. But while the Japanese discussion of values and the ?arc? does not necessarily refl ect an 
idealist vision of international relations, it does have the merit of offering an alternative vision in 
opposition to regional domination by a rising China, and that could become the strategic platform 
for a coalition.95
India still maintains an ambiguous posture regarding support for ?values? diplomacy. Sev-
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eral opinion leaders are calling for a greater emphasis in the country’s foreign policy on Indian 
democratic values and the Indian political model.96 Delhi will have to redefi ne its diplomacy in 
the years to come. For the moment, India will avoid emphasizing liberal values so as to launch 
an overt contest aimed at marginalizing or countering China, and it will probably seek to employ 
Asian cultural norms so as to promote its own profi le and infl uence within the broad Asian re-
gion.  
A third set of conceptual visions has recently emerged, following the prewar concept of a 
united Asia; based on anti-westernism and the cultural characteristics of the region, it also heeds 
the 1990s emphasis on ?Asian values? aimed at assigning priority to economic development—
hence the Asian economic miracle—over so-called (implicitly ?western?) universal human 
rights.  While it recognizes the originality of Asian culture and values, this new concept also in-
cludes universal values and norms like democracy, that are deemed suitable for Asia.97 This third 
wave of regionalist values is called ?Neo-Asian Values.?98 This new approach is consistent with 
the Japanese and Indian visions of East Asian regionalism.
Governments emphasize the conceptual ideal of ?community? while they are hedging one 
against another in Asia. The fl uid balance of power in Asia dictates that mutual suspicion and 
pragmatic behaviour will remain characteristic features of the region’s political landscape. While 
India and Japan share interests, they do not assign a high priority to their bilateral relationship, 
compared to their partnerships with China and the U.S. The Japan-India partnership is an inter-
esting element in the current evolution of the Great Game in Asia, especially when there may be 
some prospects for a future concert of powers. However, it is not yet strong enough to signifi -
cantly shape the course of international relations in Asia, and it is still very much dependent upon 
the U.S. and China factors.99 
5. Conclusion 
 
Japan and India adopt a functionalist approach toward East Asian regionalism: their 
aim is to preserve peace and prosperity in the region and build a free-trade zone in order 
to sustain economic growth and promote Asian stability. At the same time, they support a 
broader vision of East Asia, from India to Australia, in order to encourage multipolarity in 
the region and create a favorable context in which they may advance their national interests. 
From a constructivist point of view, the Japan-India vision of a Greater Asia, which draws 
upon a common pre-war refl ection on Asian identity, could be persuasive and relevant for 
current regionalism, especially in the context of a blurred or unarticulated Chinese vision.100 
Finally, from a realist point of view, Japan-India rapprochement cannot feasibly represent a 
new axis against China, even if the balancing motive is present. 
However, this nascent partnership is still dependent upon the international context 
and is not yet in a position to shape the system to any signifi cant degree. Also, the relation-
ship suffers from the gap between Indian’s political will to draw nearer to Japan as part of 
a strategy to become a central player on the Asian scene, and Japan’s interest in engaging 
with India, although this position is consistent with its strategic priority of balancing against 
China.
Despite these limitations, the Japan-India partnership is signifi cant in that it strengthens the 
third leg of the China-Japan-India triangle in Asia. Their historical experience in dealing with the 
themes of Asian identity and regionalism in the prewar period could form the basis for allowing 
the two countries to make a signifi cant contribution to the construction of a new East Asian iden-
tity and community.
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m
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